Introduction
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a newly emerged disease caused by a previously unknown coronavirus [1] [2] [3] . It joins a long list of emerging infections 4 . However, unlike other contenders such as avian influenza, Nipah virus, Hendra virus, or hantaviruses it has established the capacity for efficient human-to-human transmission and thus poses a major threat to international public health. For this reason, the World Health Organisation (WHO) has described SARS as the first serious and readily transmissible disease to emerge in the 21st century 5 . The response to the outbreak was extraordinary. The causative agent was conclusively identified on 17 April following work through global and regional networks of virologists. On 28 April, Vietnam became the first country to stop local transmission of SARS, followed by the Philippines on 20 May, and Singapore on 31 May (15) . By June the number of new cases was gradually dwindling and by the end of June the global SARS epidemic, at least in its initial phase, was under control. There had been over 8000 cases in 30 countries worldwide and over 800 deaths (Table 1) . 
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Case definition
WHO has developed a clinical case definition for SARS in oder to describe the epidemiology of the disease, to monitor its spread, and to provide the basis for advice on prevention and control 16 . Close contact is defined as having cared for, lived with, or had direct contact with respiratory secretions or body fluids of a suspect or probable case of SARS.
Suspect case
Exclusion criteria
A case should be excluded if an alternative diagnosis can fully explain illness (but not simply on the basis of a negative test for SARS coronavirus.) 
There is a slight excess of cases in women, probably due to the predominance of female health workers. Most cases have been in people aged between 25-44 years. The median age of cases was 35 years in Guangdong province 17 , 36 years in Singapore
18
, 39 years in Hong Kong 10 and 45 years in Canada 19 . There have been very few cases in children and in older people. However, the highest age-specific incidence is in older people and the relatively small numbers in this age group most likely reflect the younger population profile of countries such as China ( Figure 5 ).
9
Figure 5 Number of SARS cases by age and a g e -s p e c i f i c i n c i d e n c e , G u a n g d o n g province, China. 1 November 2002-30 April 2003 (n=1454)
This means that in countries with a substantial proportion of older people, such as many western countries, far more cases might be expected in older people if community transmission of SARS occurs. The proportion of cases with underlying disease is between 10-25% depending on the setting in which infection occurs, being higher in situations where nosocomial transmission to other patients occurred as in Canada 19 . The commonest co-morbidity is diabetes or chronic heart disease.
Between 24-62% of SARS cases have been in health care workers, the proportion varying by the type of case series and declining as experience in the application of hospital infection control measures has improved [17] [18] [19] [20] .
For example, in Guangdong, the proportion of cases in health care workers was 32% in January 2003, declining to 27% in February, and 17% by March and April 17 ( Figure 1 ). The largest staff group affected has been nurses, but cases have also occurred in doctors, paramedics, housekeeping staff, and medical students. No cases have been reported in laboratory or pathology staff. 
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Key Points
Clinical features
SARS generally begins with a prodrome of fever (>38°C), which is often high, often associated with chills and rigors and sometimes accompanied by other symptoms including headache, malaise, and myalgia (Table 2 ). Some cases have mild respiratory symptoms though these are not prominent in the early stage of the illness. A few patients have reported diarrhoea during the febrile prodrome. After 3-7 days, a lower respiratory phase begins with the onset of a dry, non-productive cough or dyspnoea. Symptoms are milder in children 17, 21 whilst in older people respiratory symptoms may be more prominent 17 .
. The incubation period will vary from one case to another according to the route by which the person was exposed, the dose of virus received, and other factors such as immune status. Although there have been anecdotal reports of incubation periods longer than 10 days, these have not been corroborated.
Period of infectivity
The initial rapid spread of SARS in hospitals in Hanoi, Vietnam and in Hong Kong first indicated that the disease was highly contagious. Since then it has become clear that most cases of SARS occur in close contacts of patients, particularly household members, and in health care workers, other patients and visitors inadvertently exposed to a case 10, 12 . The period of infectivity appears to be greatest after the person with SARS develops respiratory symptoms, but transmission may occur during the prodromal period 24 ( Figure 6 ). Persons with SARS do not appear to be infectious during the incubation period or after febrile symptoms have resolved. Further viral studies will help clarify the stages of the illness when virus shedding is greatest and the concentration of virus in various body fluids. followed. Observations from Hong Kong suggest that this risk is greatest when a hospital receives its first admissions of SARS, when patients are admitted to a general ward, and when large numbers of patients are admitted over a short period of time 27 . Nosocomial spread is less likely when patients are admitted directly to a designated ward. One casecontrol study of risk factors for transmission in hospital staff caring for patients with SARS found that fewer staff who wore masks and gowns, and washed their hands became infected compared with those who didn't, though only not wearing a mask was independently associated with increased risk 28 . Investigation of one incident among protected health care workers suggested that ill-fitting masks or contamination during mask removal were factors in infection 29 .
Transmission in the community SARS transmits readily within the household setting, although if patients are isolated early in the course of the illness, secondary transmission to other members of the household can be prevented (30) . Other instances of spread in the community are rare with the highest risk probably being in those exposed to symptomatic patients in confined areas such as taxi drivers, and airline staff and passengers. A review by WHO of 35 flights with symptomatic probable SARS cases on board identified 4 flights during which in-flight transmission may have occurred (31) . One flight was associated with 22 secondary cases including two flight attendants. The affected passengers were seated within seven rows in front and five rows behind the index case suggesting that the infection spread through exposure to respiratory droplets. Cases in other settings are rare though there have been reports of transmission in the banqueting room of a restaurant, in the workplace, and at a wholesale market 18 . In contrast to experience in hospitals, there have been very few large outbreaks in the community. One notable exception was a large and sudden cluster of over 300 cases that occurred in residents of the Amoy Gardens housing estate in Hong Kong 32 . Cases associated with this cluster were much more likely to present with diarrhoea and to require intensive care compared with previously documented SARS cases. This raised the possibility of transmission by a different route and infection with a high virus load such as might happen following exposure to a concentrated environmental source. Subsequent investigations ruled out airborne or waterborne transmission and suggested that the outbreak was primarily caused by contaminated sewage entering households through dried U-traps in the bathroom floor drain.
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Key Points
SARS: Transmission in community ! Transmits readily in household setting ! Early isolation of patients prevents secondary transmission to other household members ! Reports of transmission in taxis, aircraft
Superspreaders/superspreading event patient On average, one SARS generates around three secondary cases 30 However, certain individuals with SARS who have been implicated in spreading the disease to numerous (10 or more) other individuals, and these cases have been described as 'superspreaders' 18, 33 ( Figure 7 ). Several such individuals have been described particularly during the early days of the SARS outbreak. They include the hotel index case in Hong Kong who triggered the worldwide dissemination of SARS as well as the index case for each of the outbreaks in Vietnam and Singapore 7, 11, 13 . Superspreaders have also been described with other diseases such as Ebola 34 .
The explanation for the apparent high infectivity of these patients remains unknown. It may be that they were co-infected with another virus and that this caused them to secrete an exceptionally high amount of infectious material or that some other factor, perhaps in the environment, amplified the potential for transmission at some key phase of virus shedding. Alternatively, high secondary attack rates in hospital staff, relatives and other visitors that some superspreaders caused may be a consequence of the absence of stringent hospital infection control measures before the infectivity of SARS was recognised. Isolation of contacts, rapid admission of cases to hospital, and improved hospital infection control have all been shown to significantly reduce the average number of new cases of SARS arising from a single source case 30 . 
Figure 7 Probable cases of SARS by reported source of infection showing superspreaders (Cases
Prevention and control
Breaking the chain of transmission At present, the most effective way to control SARS is to break the chain of transmission from infected to healthy people. There are three key actions necessary to achieve this: early case detection, patient isolation, and contact tracing (Table 3) 35 .
Case detection aims to identify a SARS case as soon as possible after the onset of symptoms. Once a case is identified, the next step is to ensure they are isolated promptly and managed according to strict infection control procedures. Finally, it is vital to identify all close contacts of each case and make sure they are carefully followed-up, including daily health checks and voluntary home isolation.
These measures limit the daily number of contacts possible for each potentially infectious case. By shortening the amount of time that elapses between onset of illness and isolation of the patient the opportunity for the virus to spread to others is reduced, as is the average number of new cases generated by each case (the effective reproduction number) 21, 30 ( Figure  6 ). If each new SARS patient infects, on average, less than one person then the outbreak will die out, otherwise the disease will continue to spread.
Surveillance and reporting
Good surveillance and rapid reporting is the basis of case detection and is required to instigate contact tracing and promptly identify outbreaks. Most surveillance systems rely on notification of infectious diseases by clinical practitioners. In the case of SARS, this has been achieved by voluntary reporting by clinicians of cases meeting the WHO case definition firstly to local public health authorities and then onwards to national ministries of health and the WHO itself. The use of electronic systems can assist in the rapid reporting and response to suspect cases.The current clinical case definition has worked well to control the SARS outbreak but a more precise definition will be needed for longer-term surveillance 36 . Until a highly reliable, sensitive and specific early test is available, diagnosis of SARS will inevitably depend on evaluation of symptoms and history of contact. When local transmission of SARS has ceased, clusters of atypical pneumonia and nosocomial transmission to health care staff or hospital visitors will become important sentinel events for recognising new instances of SARS.
Isolation of patients
The earliest possible isolation of all suspect and probable cases of SARS in hospital is
Detection and protection mesasures to control SARS
• Prompt identification of persons with SARS, their movements and contacts • Effective isolation of SARS patients in hospitals • Appropriate protection of health care workers treating SARS patients • Comprehensive identification and isolation of suspected SARS cases • Exit screening of international travellers • Timely and accurate reporting and sharing of information with other authorities and /or governments vital. A short time between the onset of symptoms and isolation of the patient reduces opportunities for transmission of infection to other people and reduces the number of contacts that require active follow-up 30 . It also gives patients the best chance of receiving lifesaving care should their condition take a critical course. In an outbreak of SARS every effort should be made to reduce the average time from onset of symptoms to isolation to under three days. SARS has clearly demonstrated that a single case admitted to an unprepared hospital can ignite a new outbreak.
Key Points SARS: Prevention and Control Breaking the chain of transmission
The infection control measures for a Radiology department are discussed in a separate chapter towards the end of the book.
Contact tracing and isolation of contacts
The case should be interviewed by a trained health worker as soon as possible after the diagnosis of SARS is made, either face-to-face or by telephone. If the patient is too ill to be interviewed a proxy contact history should be obtained from the next-of kin. The date of onset of symptoms should be corroborated and details of all close contacts since that date obtained. Close contacts are defined as anyone who cared for, lived with, or had direct contact with respiratory secretions or body fluids or stool of person with SARS 16 .
All close contacts should be followed up for 10 days from the last date of contact with the case. Quarantine or home confinement of contacts was employed with considerable success to bring the outbreaks in mainland China, Hong Kong and Singapore under control. The temperature of all contacts should be monitored daily, preferably by a health worker. It may be necessary to make arrangements to provide the household with food supplies and other essential commodities during the period of observation. In overcrowded households it may be preferable to relocate the contacts to alternative accommodation to limit the risk of secondary transmission within the household.
If the source of infection in the index case is not known a full contact history for the 10 days before the date of onset of symptoms should be obtained. This will include details of all persons who may have had face-to-face contact with the case, as well as information on the workplace, visits to hospitals or other health care facilities, visits to crowded places, details of journeys on public transport, and overnight stays outside the home. Where there are several cases with an unidentified source, it is important to correlate contact histories to identify any common links. A final report of the outbreak should be prepared and presented to the responsible authority each time an OCT is convened. The plan should regularly updated and revised in the light of changing circumstances.
Management of an outbreak
Public education
An outbreak of a serious infectious disease that is poorly understood and for which no treatment is available inevitably produces great public concern. As far as possible, it is important to give the public clear and unambiguous information about the nature of the disease and the risk it poses. Mass media campaigns to educate the public were an important part of the response to SARS. The wearing of a mask, other than by those in close contact with a suspect or probable case, is unlikely to be of value. However, information about the symptoms of the disease and advice to encourage prompt reporting of symptoms is sensible. In some circumstances, the establishment of fever clinics to screen individuals with symptoms and to relieve pressure on emergency rooms may be helpful 36 .
Border control measures and travel precautions
In areas where person-to-person transmission of SARS has been documented, screening of travellers and border control measures are indicated 38, 39 . All travellers should be made aware of the symptoms of SARS and advised to seek immediate medical attention should symptoms occur. Departing international passengers should be asked to complete a brief questionnaire on any history of contact with a suspect or probable SARS case, or any symptoms of SARS during the previous 48 hours, and be screened for fever by means of a temperature check. Travellers with fever should be requested to postpone travel and seek medical attention. Persons meeting the SARS case definition should be referred to a health care facility.
If a passenger on a flight from a SARS affected area becomes noticeably ill with a fever and respiratory symptoms, the cabin crew are recommended to take basic precautions (Table  4) 39 .
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In-flight care of a'suspected case of SARS
• Isolate passenger, as far as possible, from other passengers and crew • Provide passenger with protective mask • Identify toilet for exclusive use of the ill passenger • Carer(s) should wear protective mask and gloves and wash hands after contact with ill passenger • Captain should radio ahead to alert port health authorities at the destination airport • Identify all contacts on board (household members, flight attendants, and passenger in the same row or two rows in front or behind) • On arrival, place passenger in isolation until assessed by port health authorities Table 4 If medical assessment concludes that the person is a suspect or probable case of SARS all contacts during the flight should be identified and followed-up in accordance with WHO guidance.
Conclusion
The speed with which the SARS epidemic was managed demonstrates the decisive power of high-level political commitment to contain an outbreak. Extensive use of measures like patient isolation, contact tracing and follow-up, quarantine, public education and travel precautions have worked to bring the disease under control even in the absence of effective treatments or vaccines 40 .
Many unanswered questions about SARS remain, particularly about the origin of the coronavirus. If the disease has, as suspected, a wild animal reservoir then it may become endemic at low levels or re-emerge as a seasonal or epidemic infection. SARS has features
